| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued March 22, 2004 Decided June 21, 2004 | |
| Full case name | Larry D. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al. |
| Citations | 542 U.S. 177 (more) 124 S. Ct. 2451; 159 L. Ed. 2d 292; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 4385; 72 U.S.L.W. 4509; 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 406 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Defendant convicted, Justice Court of Union Township, Humboldt County; affirmed, Sixth Judicial District Court, Humboldt County; affirmed, 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2002); cert. granted, 540 U.S. 965 (2003). |
| Subsequent | Rehearing denied, 542 U.S. 960 (2004). |
| Holding | |
| Laws requiring suspects to identify themselves during investigative stops by law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment, and do not necessarily violate the Fifth Amendment.[1] | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas |
| Dissent | Stevens |
| Dissent | Breyer, joined by Souter, Ginsburg |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amends. IV, V; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123(3) | |
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a statute requiring suspects to disclose their names during a valid Terry stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first requires reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, and does not violate the Fifth Amendment if there is no allegation that their names could have caused an incrimination.
Under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the minimal intrusion on a suspect's privacy, and the legitimate need of law enforcement officers to quickly dispel suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, justified requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name. The Court also held that the identification requirement did not violate Hiibel's Fifth Amendment rights since he did not articulate a reasonable belief that his name would be used to incriminate him; however, the Court left open the possibility that Fifth Amendment privilege might apply in a situation where there was an articulated reasonable belief that giving a name could be incriminating.[1]
The Hiibel decision was narrow in that it applied only to states that have stop and identify statutes. Consequently, individuals in states without such statutes cannot be lawfully arrested solely for refusing to identify themselves during a Terry stop.
- ^ a b
In upholding Hiibel′s conviction, the Court noted
- "In this case petitioner's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him.... As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer's business." — 542 U.S. 177, at 190
- "Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here." — 542 U.S. 177, at 191
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