Hobbesian trap

The Hobbesian trap (or Schelling's dilemma) is a theory that explains why preemptive strikes occur between two groups, out of bilateral fear of an imminent attack. Without outside influences, this situation will lead to a fear spiral (catch-22, vicious circle, Nash equilibrium) in which fear will lead to an arms race which in turn will lead to increasing fear. The Hobbesian trap can be explained in terms of game theory. Although cooperation would be the better outcome for both sides, mutual distrust leads to the adoption of strategies that have negative outcomes for both individual players and all players combined.^[1] The theory has been used to explain outbreaks of conflicts and violence, spanning from individuals to states.^[2]

^ Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas (21 September 2010). "The Hobbesian Trap" (PDF). In Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 91–109. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0005. ISBN 978-0195392777. Retrieved 3 April 2013.
^ Pinker, Steven (2012). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0143122012.

[Baliga_Sjöström-1] Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas (21 September 2010). "The Hobbesian Trap" (PDF). In Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 91–109. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392777.013.0005. ISBN 978-0195392777. Retrieved 3 April 2013.

[Pinker_BAooN-2] Pinker, Steven (2012). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0143122012.

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