Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 17, 2024 Decided June 28, 2024
Full case name	Loper Bright Enterprises, et al. v. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. Relentless, Inc. et al. v. Department of Commerce, et al.
Docket nos.	22-451 22-1219
Citations	603 U.S. ___ (more)
Argument	Oral argument
Decision	Opinion
Case history
Prior	Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, 45 F.4th 359 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Ross, 544 F.Supp.3d 82 (D.D.C. 2021).
Subsequent	Remanded to D.C. Circuit.
Questions presented
Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.
Holding
The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled.
Court membership
Chief Justice John Roberts Associate Justices Clarence Thomas · Samuel Alito Sonia Sotomayor · Elena Kagan Neil Gorsuch · Brett Kavanaugh Amy Coney Barrett · Ketanji Brown Jackson
Case opinions
Majority	Roberts, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett
Concurrence	Thomas
Concurrence	Gorsuch
Dissent	Kagan, joined by Sotomayor; Jackson (as it applies to Relentless)
Jackson (in Loper Bright)[a] took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
Administrative Procedure Act
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984)

Administrative law of the United States
General Rulemaking Notice of proposed rulemaking Adjudication Administrative law judge Code of Federal Regulations Federal Register
Statutory framework Administrative Procedure Act Freedom of Information Act National Environmental Policy Act Government in the Sunshine Act National Emergencies Act Inspector General Act Regulatory Flexibility Act Paperwork Reduction Act Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Congressional Review Act Federal Vacancies Reform Act
Regulatory coordination Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Administrative Conference Executive orders Cost–benefit analysis (Executive Order 12866)
Judicial review of agency action Arbitrary and capricious State Farm Chevron deference Auer deference Loper Bright Committed to agency discretion Due process Londoner Bi-Metallic Goldberg Mathews Exhaustion Major questions Nationwide injunction Ripeness Abbott Labs Standing Lujan
Separation of powers Appointments Clause Freytag Noel Canning Congressional oversight Authorization Organic statute Appropriation Hearings Senate confirmation Independent agencies Humphrey's Executor Seila Law Unitary executive theory Legislative veto Chadha Nondelegation
Regulated fields (and agencies) Antitrust and competition FTC CPSC CFPB Banking Treasury OCC FDIC FRB Communication FCC Energy DOE FERC Environment EPA FWS Food FDA CDC Health care HHS Immigration DHS EOIR Labor DOL NLRB Patent/trademark PTO Securities SEC CFTC Taxation IRS TC Trade DOC ITC Transportation DOT STB NTSB Social Security SSA
Related topics Constitutional law Statutory interpretation
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Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in the field of administrative law, the law governing regulatory agencies. Together with its companion case, Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, it overruled the principle of Chevron deference established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), which had directed courts to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguity in a law that the agency enforces.^[1] In lieu of Chevron, the decision assigns the determination of congressional ambiguity to the judicial branch, with executive agency expertise still to be considered under the weaker Skidmore deference.

Both cases originated from fishing companies challenging a rule established by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for fishing companies to pay for the cost of federal monitors that may be assigned to their boats, under authorization of the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The company claimed that the Act did not allow NMFS to pass the monitors' costs to the fishing companies, challenging the Chevron deference that was held in the NMFS' favor during lower court hearings.

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