Operation Change of Direction 11

Operation Change of Direction
	Part of 2006 Lebanon War
Date	August 11–14, 2006
Location	Southern Lebanon
Result	IDF captures some territory but fails to seize objectives.; End of the war and Israeli withdrawal under UN Security Council Resolution 1701
Belligerents
Israel Defense Forces	Hezbollah
Commanders and leaders
Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz ; Chief of staff; Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky ; Deputy Chief of Staff; Brig. Gen. Udi Adam ; Head of Northern Command Brig. Gen. Eyal Eisenberg ; OC 98th Div.; Brig. Gen. Gal Hirsch ; OC 91st Div.; Brig. Gen. Guy Tzur ; OC 162nd Div.; Brig. Gen. Erez Zuckerman ; OC 366th Div	Hassan Nasrallah; Ali Mahmoud Salih †
Units involved
91st Infantry Division; (The Galilee Formation); 98th Paratrooper Division; (The Fire Formation); 162nd Armored Division; (The Steel Formation); 366th Armored Division ; (Pillar of Fire Formation)	Nasr Unit (Special Forces); Village mobilization units
Strength
30,000 inside Lebanon	1,000 in area (south of the Litani river)
Casualties and losses
34 killed; 447 IDF wounded,; 1 helicopter downed,; 20+ vehicles damaged and immobilized	9 killed (in the north only); 1 captured(Hezbollah claim); 80+ killed(IDF estimate)
	1 Israeli civilian killed and 157 Israeli civilians wounded; Lebanese civilian casualties unknown

The Operation Change of Direction 11 was the final offensive operation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the 2006 Lebanon War that began on August 11, 2006, and ended three days later when the ceasefire came into effect. It involved a tripling of Israeli forces inside Lebanon and aimed at encircling Hizbullah forces in south Lebanon. The plan was to advance westwards along the Litani River from the Galilee Panhandle, combined with helicopter landings behind enemy lines, intended to be the largest in IDF history, and simultaneous advances northwards in the central sector and along the Mediterranean coast. The plan was to follow up the offensive by several weeks of mopping-up operations in the surrounded territories, eliminating Hizbullah infrastructure, especially in the launching areas of Katyusha rockets.

The offensive was called off halfway due to heavy casualties and the implementation of the UN ceasefire.^[10] At least 33 Israeli officers and soldiers were killed and over 400 were wounded, an Israeli Air Force (IAF) helicopter was shot down and scores of Israeli tanks were damaged. The IDF never reached the Litani river and failed to surround Hizbullah forces in South Lebanon. Instead the Israeli government on August 13, accepted a ceasefire in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. When the ceasefire commenced the following day IDF found itself in control of 16 different pockets or sectors in South Lebanon, often isolated from each other and from Israeli territory. IDF expressed a desire to withdraw from these positions as quickly as possible, as soon as a ceasefire agreement was in place. Hizbullah remained in control of both Bint Jbeil and Ayta ash-Sha'b, close to the border, while IDF soldiers were operating well to the north of both these towns.^[11]

^ Matthews, Matt (2007). We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Institute Studies Press. ISBN 978-0-16-079899-3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 March 2009. Retrieved 10 August 2009.. Retrieved 10 August 2009.
^ "Some 30,000 Israeli troops in Lebanon — army radio". Reuters via Yahoo! News Asia. 2006-08-13. Archived from the original on 2008-02-15.
^ Harel and Issacharoff, p. 172
^ Nicholas Blanford (August 11, 2006). "Hizbullah's resilience built on years of homework". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved January 23, 2012.
^ ^a ^b "The final Winograd Commission report, pp. 598–610 (Hebrew)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-08-30. Retrieved 4 December 2011.
^ Cite error: The named reference YnetTanks was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference SafGhand was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference Al Akhbar was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Cite error: The named reference jpost was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Harel and Issacharoff (2008), p. 235
^ Matthews pp. 47

[csi-1] Matthews, Matt (2007). We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Institute Studies Press. ISBN 978-0-16-079899-3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 March 2009. Retrieved 10 August 2009.. Retrieved 10 August 2009.

[08-09-2] "Some 30,000 Israeli troops in Lebanon — army radio". Reuters via Yahoo! News Asia. 2006-08-13. Archived from the original on 2008-02-15.

[3] Harel and Issacharoff, p. 172

[4] Nicholas Blanford (August 11, 2006). "Hizbullah's resilience built on years of homework". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved January 23, 2012.

[Wino-5] "The final Winograd Commission report, pp. 598–610 (Hebrew)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-08-30. Retrieved 4 December 2011.

[YnetTanks-6] Cite error: The named reference YnetTanks was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[SafGhand-7] Cite error: The named reference SafGhand was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Al_Akhbar-8] Cite error: The named reference Al Akhbar was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[jpost-9] Cite error: The named reference jpost was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[Issacharoff_2008_p._235-10] Harel and Issacharoff (2008), p. 235

[Matthews-11] Matthews pp. 47

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