Operation Ten-Go

Battle of the East China Sea
Part of the Battle of Okinawa and the Pacific War
Yamato under attack
Date 7 April 1945 (1945-04-07) Location Between Kyūshū and the Ryūkyū Islands Result American victory
Belligerents
United States	Japan
Commanders and leaders
Marc Mitscher Joseph J. Clark Frederick C. Sherman	Seiichi Itō † Keizō Komura Kosaku Aruga † Tameichi Hara
Units involved
Fifth Fleet Task Force 58	2nd Fleet
Strength
11 aircraft carriers 6 battleships 11 cruisers 30+ destroyers 386 aircraft	1 battleship 1 light cruiser 8 destroyers 115 aircraft, mostly kamikaze
Casualties and losses
97 killed 122 wounded 10-13 aircraft destroyed 1 aircraft carrier damaged 1 battleship damaged 1 destroyer damaged 52 aircraft damaged	4,137 killed[1] 1 battleship sunk 1 light cruiser sunk 4 destroyers sunk 1 destroyer severely damaged ~100 aircraft destroyed

Operation Ten-Go (天号作戦, Ten-gō Sakusen), also known as Operation Heaven One (or Ten-ichi-gō 天一号), was the last major Japanese naval operation in the Pacific Theater of World War II. In April 1945, the Japanese battleship Yamato, the largest battleship in the world, and nine other Japanese warships, embarked from Japan for a suicide attack on Allied forces engaged in the Battle of Okinawa. The Japanese force was attacked by U.S. carrier-borne aircraft before it could reach Okinawa; Yamato and five other Japanese warships were sunk.

The battle demonstrated U.S. air supremacy in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater and the vulnerability of surface ships without air cover to aerial attack. The battle also exhibited Japan's willingness to make extreme sacrifices in kamikaze attacks aimed at delaying the Allied advance upon the Japanese home islands.

Furthermore, the engagement was also paramount by enabling U.S. forces to prevent Japan from holding a significant advantage over the Allies at Okinawa.^[2][3] The designation of Yamato as a beached fortification against Allied aerial and naval bombardment of Okinawa would have become detrimental towards the invading armies,^[4][5] in that, alike to Operation Downfall, the anticipated losses would have substantially increased for maritime combatants at large,^{[6] [7][a]} likewise with surrounding infantry support.^[8][9] It is generally accepted amongst historians that the prior removal of Yamato was a preliminary objective of the Allies before any further assaults.^[10][11]

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