Relations between Nazi Germany and the Arab world

Relations between Nazi Germany (1933–1945) and the Arab world ranged from indifference, confrontation and collaboration.^[1][2][3] Nazi Germany used collaborators and propaganda throughout the Arab world in search of alliance for their political goals.^[4][5] The cooperative political and military relationships were based on shared hostilities towards common enemies, such as the United Kingdom and France, who held colonies in the Arab world, along with communism, and Zionism. These attempts were stifled by the fact that Nazi Germany's allies too held colonies in the Arab world, namely Spain, Vichy France and Italy, and thus had to balance competing interests in the region. Another foundation of such collaborations was the antisemitism of the Nazis and their hostility towards the United Kingdom and France, which was admired by some Arab and Muslim leaders, most notably the exiled Palestinian leader, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini (see subsection in "antisemitism in Islam").^[6]

One notable example was the Anglo-Iraqi War, when the Golden Square (a political clique of four generals led by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani) overthrew the pro-British 'Abd al-Ilah regency in Iraq and installed a pro-Axis government which was swiftly overthrown by British forces with the help of local Christian Assyrian levies.^[7][8][9] German Arabic propaganda was launched to stoke anti-Allied sentiment in the region.^[10] In 1941 the German Foreign Office noted:

‘The Islamic concept of Holy War cannot be applied with the current distribution of powers. Arabism and Islam are not congruent. The Arabs that we have to take into account do not fight in favor of religious, but political goals. Matters of Islam need to be dealt with in a tactful manner.”^[11]

In public and private, Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler made complimentary statements about Islam as both a religion and a political ideology, describing it as a more disciplined, militaristic, political, and practical form of religion than Christianity is, and commending what they perceived were Muhammad's skills in politics and military leadership.^[12] Minor Nazi party branches were established in the Middle East before the war by local German diaspora.^[13] In June 1941, Wehrmacht High Command Directive No. 32 and the "Instructions for Special Staff F" designated Special Staff F as the Wehrmacht's central agency for all issues that affected the Arab world.^[14]

Despite Amin al-Husseini's efforts to acquire German backing for Arab independence, Hitler refused to support them, remarking that he "wanted nothing from the Arabs". Nazi Germany was reluctant to initiate disputes with the Italian Empire or Vichy France colonies.^[15] Nazi Germany sent officials and military equipment to Middle Eastern forces fighting alongside Axis powers during the Middle East theatre of World War II.

In the last will and testament of Adolf Hitler, Hitler complained that Italy's colonies in the Libya and East Africa damaged the credibility of the Axis powers as an anti-colonial force:

Our Italian ally has been a source of embarrassment to us everywhere. It was this alliance, for instance, which prevented us from pursuing a revolutionary policy in North Africa. In the nature of things, this territory was becoming an Italian preserve and it was as such that the Duce laid claim to it. Had we been on our own, we could have emancipated the Moslem countries dominated by France; and that would have had enormous repercussions in the Near East, dominated by Britain, and in Egypt. But with our fortunes linked to those of the Italians, the pursuit of such a policy was not possible. All Islam vibrated at the news of our victories. The Egyptians, the Irakis [sic] and the whole of the Near East were all ready to rise in revolt. Just think what we could have done to help them, even to incite them, as would have been both our duty and in our own interest! But the presence of the Italians at our side paralysed us; it created a feeling of malaise among our Islamic friends, who inevitably saw in us accomplices, willing or unwilling, of their oppressors. For the Italians in these parts of the world are more bitterly hated, of course, than either the British or the French. The memories of the barbarous, reprisals taken against the Senussi are still vivid. Then again the ridiculous pretensions of the Duce to be regarded as The Sword of Islam evokes the same sneering chuckle now as it did before the war. This title, which is fitting for Mahomed and a great conqueror like Omar, Mussolini caused to be conferred on himself by a few wretched brutes whom he had either bribed or terrorized into doing so. We had a great chance of pursuing a splendid policy with regard to Islam. But we missed the bus, as we missed it on several other occasions, thanks to our loyalty to the Italian alliance! In this theatre of operations, then, the Italians prevented us from playing our best card, the emancipation of the French subjects and the raising of the standard of revolt in the countries oppressed by the British. Such a policy would have aroused the enthusiasm of the whole of Islam. It is a characteristic of the Moslem world, from the shores of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific, that what affects one, for good or for evil, affects all.^[16]