Russian information war against Ukraine

The building of TASS, a Russian state-owned news agency accused of propaganda against Ukraine.

The Russian information war against Ukraine was articulated by the Russian government as part of the Gerasimov doctrine.^[1]^[2]^[3] They believed that Western governments were instigating color revolutions in former Soviet states which posed a threat to Russia.^[4]

The concept of informatsionnaya voyna (Russian: информационная война, lit. 'informational war') encompasses various strategies, including cyberwarfare, often described as technical defenses against technical attacks in warfare.^[5] However, cyberwarfare is just one aspect of Russia's information war, which may include controlling undersea communications cables, shaping national narratives, manipulating the news cycle, and flooding the information space with Russian bots and trolls. The goal is to achieve strategic victory and exert reflexive control.^[6]^[7] These efforts were used as part of its disinformation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Due to effective censorship, most media outlets in Russia are government-controlled, allowing Kremlin messaging to successfully sway the citizens of the Russian Federation to support its approach in Ukraine.^[8] The Kremlin has denied waging war in Ukraine, claiming it only wants to protect Russian speakers against Ukrainian Nazis.^[9] This narrative has been reinforced by Russian television since 2014, giving it an advantage through repetition and familiarity.^[10] According to a poll, 58 percent of Russians approved of this perspective between 28 February and 3 March 2022.^[10]

^ Gerasimov, Valery (2013). "The value of science in prediction" (PDF). Military Review. Vol. 27. Military-Industrial Kurier.
^ Galeotti, Mark (2018). "The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat". Critical Studies on Security. 7 (2): 157–161. doi:10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623. S2CID 159811828.
^ "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'". Foreign Policy. 5 March 2018. Retrieved 6 March 2018.
^ What Is the ‘Technology of the Colour Revolutions,’ and Why Does It Occupy Such a Prominent Place in Russian Threat Perceptions?, Mitchell Binding. Canadian Military Journal, Volume 19, Number 4, Autumn 2019
^ [Russia's Information Warfare: Exploring the Cognitive Dimension], Blagovest Tashev, PhD; Lieutenant Colonel Michael Purcell (Ret); and Major Brian McLaughlin (Ret). Marine Corps University, MCU Journal vol. 10, no. 2, Fall 2019 https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.2019100208 p.133
^ Stukal, Denis; Sanovich, Sergey; Bonneau, Richard; Tucker, Joshua A. (February 2022). "Why Botter: How Pro-Government Bots Fight Opposition in Russia" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 116 (1). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association: 843–857. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001507. ISSN 1537-5943. LCCN 08009025. OCLC 805068983. S2CID 247038589. Retrieved 10 March 2022.
^ Gilles, Keir. "Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Fellowship Monograph 9. NATO Defense College ISBN 978-88-96898-16-1 p.4" (PDF).
^ Manjoo, Farhad (2 March 2022). "Opinion: Putin No Longer Seems Like a Master of Disinformation". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 25 November 2022. Retrieved 17 September 2024.
^ Putin says he will 'denazify' Ukraine. Here's the history behind that claim, Miriam Berger. Washington Post, 24 February 2022
^ ^a ^b Don’t Sleep on Russian Information-War Capabilities: Indeed, the Ukraine invasion should galvanize U.S. investment in its own messaging infrastructure, Alyssa Demus and Christopher Paul. Defense One, 5 April 2022

[:02-1] Gerasimov, Valery (2013). "The value of science in prediction" (PDF). Military Review. Vol. 27. Military-Industrial Kurier.

[:1-2] Galeotti, Mark (2018). "The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat". Critical Studies on Security. 7 (2): 157–161. doi:10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623. S2CID 159811828.

[:22-3] "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'". Foreign Policy. 5 March 2018. Retrieved 6 March 2018.

[4] What Is the ‘Technology of the Colour Revolutions,’ and Why Does It Occupy Such a Prominent Place in Russian Threat Perceptions?, Mitchell Binding. Canadian Military Journal, Volume 19, Number 4, Autumn 2019

[marine2-5] [Russia's Information Warfare: Exploring the Cognitive Dimension], Blagovest Tashev, PhD; Lieutenant Colonel Michael Purcell (Ret); and Major Brian McLaughlin (Ret). Marine Corps University, MCU Journal vol. 10, no. 2, Fall 2019 https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.2019100208 p.133

[Botter-20222-6] Stukal, Denis; Sanovich, Sergey; Bonneau, Richard; Tucker, Joshua A. (February 2022). "Why Botter: How Pro-Government Bots Fight Opposition in Russia" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 116 (1). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association: 843–857. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001507. ISSN 1537-5943. LCCN 08009025. OCLC 805068983. S2CID 247038589. Retrieved 10 March 2022.

[nato2-7] Gilles, Keir. "Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Fellowship Monograph 9. NATO Defense College ISBN 978-88-96898-16-1 p.4" (PDF).

[master2-8] Manjoo, Farhad (2 March 2022). "Opinion: Putin No Longer Seems Like a Master of Disinformation". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 25 November 2022. Retrieved 17 September 2024.

[9] Putin says he will 'denazify' Ukraine. Here's the history behind that claim, Miriam Berger. Washington Post, 24 February 2022

[d12-10] Don’t Sleep on Russian Information-War Capabilities: Indeed, the Ukraine invasion should galvanize U.S. investment in its own messaging infrastructure, Alyssa Demus and Christopher Paul. Defense One, 5 April 2022

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