Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian civil war

The Syrian Civil War is an intensely sectarian war.^[2] However, the initial phases of the uprising in 2011 featured a broad, cross-sectarian opposition to the rule of Bashar al-Assad, reflecting a collective desire for political reform and social justice, transcending ethnic and religious divisions.^[3] Over time, the civil war has largely transformed into a conflict between ruling minority Alawite government and allied Shi'a governments such as Iran; pitted against the country's Sunni Muslim majority who are aligned with the Syrian opposition and its Turkish and Persian Gulf state backers. Sunni Muslims make up the majority of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and many hold high administrative positions, while Alawites and members of almost every minority have also been active on the rebel side.^[4][5]

Despite this, Sunni recruits face systematic discrimination in the armed forces and ninety percentage of the officer corps are dominated by Alawite members vetted by the regime; based on their sectarian loyalty to Assad dynasty. SAA also pursues a truculent anti-religious policy within its ranks; marked by animosity towards Sunni religious expressions such as regular observance of salah (prayers), Hijab (headcoverings), abstinence from alcoholic drinks, etc.^[6][7] The conflict has drawn in various ethno-religious minorities, including Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Palestinians, Kurds, Yazidi, Mhallami, Arab Christians, Mandaeans, Turkmens and Greeks.^[8][9]

In 2011, all the religious and ethnic communities, Muslim and non-Muslim, Arab, Turkmen or Kurd were united in their uprising against Assadist rule; disenchanted with the regime's corruption, authoritarian repression, nepotism, increasing poverty, unemployment, etc. This early unity highlighted the revolutionary subjectivity challenging the regime's attempts to sectarians the conflict, disputing the notion that the uprising was driven by sectarian reasons.^[10] The peaceful movement, characterised by its anti-sectarian and pro-democracy stance, played a crucial role in articulating the non-sectarian grievances against the regime's authoritarian tactics.^[11] Bashar al-Assad's strategy of importing Iran-backed Shia fundamentalists engaged in regional conflict with Sunni-majority countries and his portrayal as being the sole defender of Alawite interests from the Syrian Sunni majority; led to the transformation of the conflict into a sectarian war by late 2013.^[12] Khomeinist militants have used its influence in regime-held areas to attempt Shi'ification through forced conversions, establishment of shrines, ethnic cleansing and demographic shifts by bringing in foreign Twelver Shia settlers from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.^[13][14][15] Iranian government has been focusing its missionary efforts on converting Syria's Alawite minority to Twelver Shi'ism, by recruiting them in Iranian cultural and religious centres.^[16]