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Hamas

For other uses, see Hamas (disambiguation).
"Islamic Resistance Movement" redirects here. For other uses, see Islamic Resistance (disambiguation).
For their military wing, often also referred to as just "Hamas" in Israeli sources, see Al-Qassam Brigades.

Islamic Resistance Movement
حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
Chairman of the Political BureauHamas temporary committee (acting)[a][1][2]
Deputy Chairman of the Political BureauVacant[b]
Chairman of the Shura CouncilMuhammad Ismail Darwish
Leader in the Gaza StripMohammed Sinwar
Military commanderMohammed Sinwar
Founders
... and others
Founded10 December 1987 (10 December 1987)
HeadquartersGaza City, Gaza Strip
Military wingAl-Qassam Brigades
Ideology
Political positionRight-wing[20][21]
ReligionSunni Islam
International affiliationAxis of Resistance (informal)
Political allianceAlliance of Palestinian Forces
Colours  Green
Palestinian Legislative Council
74 / 132
Party flag
Website
hamasinfo.info[dead link]

The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas[c] (the Arabic acronym from Arabic: حركة المقاومة الإسلامية, romanized: Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah),[24][d] is a Palestinian nationalist Sunni Islamist[25] political organisation with a military wing, the Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip since 2007.[26][27]

The Hamas movement was founded by Palestinian Islamic scholar Ahmed Yassin in 1987, after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation. It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.[28] In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas secured a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council by campaigning on promises of a corruption-free government and advocating for resistance as a means to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation.[29][30] In the Battle of Gaza, Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah,[31][32] and has since governed the territory separately from the Palestinian National Authority. After Hamas's takeover, Israel significantly intensified existing movement restrictions and imposed a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip.[33] Egypt began its blockade of Gaza in 2007. This was followed by multiple wars with Israel, including those in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and an ongoing one since 2023, which began with the 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel.

Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context.[34] While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007.[35][36][37] In 2017, Hamas released a new charter[38] that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel.[39][40][41] Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years[42]) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as consistent with a two-state solution,[43][44] while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[45] While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic,[46] Hamas's 2017 charter [47] removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.[48][49][50][51] It has been debated whether the charter has reflected an actual change in policy.[52][53]

In terms of foreign policy, Hamas has historically sought out relations with Egypt,[54] Iran,[54] Qatar,[55] Saudi Arabia,[56] Syria[54] and Turkey;[57] some of its relations have been impacted by the Arab Spring.[58][clarification needed] Hamas and Israel have engaged in protracted armed conflict. Key aspects of the conflict include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, water rights,[59] the permit regime, Palestinian freedom of movement,[60] and the Palestinian right of return. Hamas has attacked Israeli civilians, including using suicide bombings, as well as launching rockets at Israeli cities. Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union, have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. In 2018 and 2023, a motion at the United Nations to condemn Hamas was rejected.[e][62][63]


Cite error: There are <ref group=lower-alpha> tags or {{efn}} templates on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=lower-alpha}} template or {{notelist}} template (see the help page).

  1. ^ "Hamas to be temporarily led by five-member ruling committee". The Arab Weekly. Retrieved 24 October 2024.
  2. ^ "Who will lead Hamas after killing of Yahya Sinwar?". BBC. Retrieved 24 October 2024.
  3. ^ Downs, Ray. "Hamas leader dead after 'accidental' gunshot to head". UPI. Archived from the original on 7 December 2023. Retrieved 31 January 2024.
  4. ^ Abdelal 2016, p. 122.
  5. ^ Dalloul 2017.
  6. ^ Abu-Amr 1993, p. 10.
  7. ^ Litvak 1998, p. 151.
  8. ^ Barzak 2011.
  9. ^ AFP 2019.
  10. ^ a b c Dalacoura 2012, pp. 66–67.
  11. ^ Gelvin 2014, p. 226: "As with Islamic political organizations elsewhere, Hamas offers its followers an ideology that appropriates the universal message of Islam for what is, in effect, a nationalist struggle."
  12. ^ Stepanova 2008, p. 113.
  13. ^ Cheema 2008, p. 465: "Hamas considers Palestine the main front of jihad and viewed the uprising as an Islamic way of fighting the Occupation. The organisation's leaders argued that Islam gave the Palestinian people the power to confront Israel and described the Intifada as the return of the masses to Islam. Since its inception, Hamas has tried to reconcile nationalism and Islam. [...] Hamas claims to speak as a nationalist movement but with an Islamic-nationalist rather than a secular nationalist agenda."
  14. ^ Litvak 2004, pp. 156–57: "Hamas is primarily a religious movement whose nationalist worldview is shaped by its religious ideology."
  15. ^ Klein, Menachem (2007). "Hamas in Power". Middle East Journal. 61 (3): 442–459. doi:10.3751/61.3.13. ISSN 0026-3141. JSTOR 4330419.
  16. ^ May, Tiffany (8 October 2023). "A Quick Look at Hamas". The New York Times. Retrieved 25 September 2024.
  17. ^ Maqdsi, Muhammad. "Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine" (PDF). Palestine Studies. University of California Press. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 February 2024. Retrieved 20 March 2024.
  18. ^ Dunning 2016, p. 270.
  19. ^ Mishal & Sela 2006.
  20. ^ Mabon, Simon; Ardovini, Lucia (2018). Sectarianism in the Contemporary Middle East. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781315097930. From a political perspective, Hamas ideologically leans more to a right-wing view in its political sense...
  21. ^ Michael Jackson (1 January 2024). "Is Hamas left-wing or right-wing?". The Times of Israel. Retrieved 3 April 2025.
  22. ^ "Hamas, n. meanings, etymology and more". Oxford English Dictionary.
  23. ^ Taraki, Lisa (January–February 1989). "The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising". Middle East Report. No. 156. Tacoma, WA: MERIP. pp. 30–32. doi:10.2307/3012813. ISSN 0899-2851. JSTOR 3012813. OCLC 615545050. Archived from the original on 1 February 2022. Retrieved 1 February 2022.
  24. ^ "HAMAS". National Counterterrorism Center. Director of National Intelligence#Office of the Director of National Intelligence. September 2022. Archived from the original on 1 November 2023. Retrieved 4 February 2024.
  25. ^ Lopez, Anthony; Ireland, Carol; Ireland, Jane; Lewis, Michael (2020). The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding. Taylor & Francis. p. 239. ISBN 9780429588952. The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s. It used terrorist attacks against civilians - particularly suicide bombings – to help build a larger movement, going so far as to emerge as the recognized government of the Gaza Strip in the Palestine Authority.
  26. ^ Kear 2018, p. 22.
  27. ^ "What is Hamas? A simple guide to the armed Palestinian group". Al Jazeera. 8 October 2023. Archived from the original on 8 October 2023. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  28. ^ Higgins, Andrew (24 January 2009). "How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 26 September 2009. Retrieved 25 January 2023. When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and '80s, they seemed focused on studying the Quran, not on confrontation with Israel. The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al-Islamiya, registering the group as a charity. It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques, clubs and schools. Crucially, Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank. 'When I look back at the chain of events I think we made a mistake,' says David Hacham, who worked in Gaza in the late 1980s and early '90s as an Arab-affairs expert in the Israeli military. 'But at the time nobody thought about the possible results.' Israeli officials who served in Gaza disagree on how much their own actions may have contributed to the rise of Hamas. They blame the group's recent ascent on outsiders, primarily Iran. This view is shared by the Israeli government. 'Hamas in Gaza was built by Iran as a foundation for power, and is backed through funding, through training and through the provision of advanced weapons,' Mr. Olmert said last Saturday. Hamas has denied receiving military assistance from Iran.
  29. ^ "Hamas wins huge majority". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 5 August 2024.
  30. ^ McGreal, Chris (27 January 2006). "Hamas faces unexpected challenge: how to deal with power". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 5 August 2024.
  31. ^ Davis 2017, pp. 67–69.
  32. ^ Mukhimer 2012, pp. vii, 58.
  33. ^ "The Gaza Strip | The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade – June 2022". Archived from the original on 9 April 2024. Retrieved 7 August 2024.
  34. ^ Gelvin 2014, p. 226
  35. ^ Seurat 2019, pp. 17–19: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."
  36. ^ * Baconi 2018, pp. 114–116: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *Roy 2013, p. 210: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."
  37. ^ Baconi 2018, pp. 82: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders."
  38. ^ "Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders: Khaled Meshaal presents a new document in which Hamas accepts 1967 borders without recognising state of Israel Gaza". Al Jazeera. 2 May 2017.
  39. ^ Sources that believe that Hamas' 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders:
  40. ^ "What does Israel's declaration of war mean for Palestinians in Gaza?". Al Jazeera. 9 October 2023.
  41. ^ "What will the Israeli-Palestinian conflict look like in 30 years?". The Jerusalem Post. 22 September 2023. Even Hamas in 2017 said it was ready to accept a Palestinian state with 1967 borders if it is clear this is the consensus of the Palestinians.
  42. ^ Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod (2008). "Reframing Sacred Values" (PDF). Negotiation Journal. 24 (3): 221–246. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00182.x. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 January 2024. Retrieved 20 March 2024.
  43. ^ * Halim Rane (2009). Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms. p. 34. Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."
    • Loren D. Lybarger (2020). Palestinian Chicago. University of California Press. p. 199. Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).
    • Tristan Dunning (2016). Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy. Routledge. pp. 179–180.
  44. ^ Baconi 2018, p. 108: "Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that 'a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary.'"
  45. ^ Alsoos, Imad (2021). "From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization". Middle Eastern Studies. 57 (5): 833–856. doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006. S2CID 234860010.
  46. ^ Qossay Hamed (2023). Hamas in Power: The Question of Transformation. IGI Global. p. 161.
  47. ^ HAMAS. "Hamas 2017 Document of General Principles & Policies" (PDF). Federation of American Scientists.
  48. ^ Seurat 2019, p. 17.
  49. ^ Amira, Hass (3 May 2017). "Why Hamas' New Charter Is Aimed at Palestinians, Not Israelis". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 23 April 2023. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  50. ^ Timea Spitka (2023). National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Springer International Publishing. pp. 88–89.
  51. ^ "Khaled Meshaal: Struggle is against Israel, not Jews". Al-Jazeera. 6 May 2017. Archived from the original on 19 November 2023. Retrieved 19 November 2023.
  52. ^ Hroub, Khaled (2017). "A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter". Journal of Palestine Studies. 46 (4 (184)): 100–111. doi:10.1525/jps.2017.46.4.100. ISSN 0377-919X. JSTOR 26378710. In a similar vein, Hamas's description of itself appears in a section titled "The Movement" that is couched in language quite different from the 1988 charter. Here, Hamas stresses the nationalist and resistance aspects of its purpose far more than the religious and pan-Islamic ones...Framing the struggle in nationalist terms is not only a novel element of the 2017 document but it is repeatedly emphasized and clearly articulated...Hamas makes plain that the "conflict is with the Zionist project, not with the Jews because of their religion...The new document offers a definitive framing of the struggle against Zionism and Israel as having nothing to do with religion...In "The Position toward Occupation and Political Solutions," the document articulates a stance that reflects the movement's internal consensus on the two-state solution, that is, the creation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines...The "Resistance and Liberation" portion of the new document is also quite different in its language from the 1988 charter and other past statements. Here, there is a clear assertion of the right to a national liberation struggle on the basis of international law."
  53. ^ Spoerl, Joseph S. (2020). "Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism". Jewish Political Studies Review. 31 (1/2). Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: 210–244. ISSN 0792-335X. JSTOR 26870795. Archived from the original on 16 January 2024. Retrieved 27 January 2024. Strictly speaking, the Hamas Covenant of 1988 focused its anti-Semitic language on Zionists, for example, describing The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the blueprint for the Zionist project (Article 32) and accusing the Zionists of aiming to "annihilate Islam" (Article 28). The May 2017 "Document" continues in this vein, albeit in somewhat less florid language, asserting that "the Zionist project does not target the Palestinian people alone; it is the enemy of the Arabic and Islamic Ummah posing a grave threat to its security and interests. It is also hostile to the Ummah's aspirations for unity, renaissance, and liberation and has been the major source of its troubles. The Zionist project also poses a danger to international security and peace and to mankind…." (#15). As in the 1988 Covenant, the 2017 "Document" merely takes all the classical tropes of anti-Semitism and focuses them on Zionism, noting that "it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity" (#16). In effect, Hamas is saying that it is at war with all Jews except those who are anti-Zionist, thus it is not anti-Semitic. This can hardly be regarded as a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism.
  54. ^ a b c Seurat 2022, p. 88.
  55. ^ Baconi 2018, p. 181.
  56. ^ Samuel Ramani (1 September 2015). "Hamas's Pivot to Saudi Arabia". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  57. ^ Seurat 2022, p. 254.
  58. ^ Seurat 2022, p. 115,214.
  59. ^ "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". Government of Canada. Archived from the original on 18 February 2018. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
  60. ^ "Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy" (PDF). World Bank. 9 May 2007. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 April 2010. Retrieved 29 March 2010. Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
  61. ^ DW 2018.
  62. ^ "UN rejects US motion to condemn Hamas". dw.com. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 5 August 2024.
  63. ^ "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling for Immediate, Sustained Humanitarian Truce Leading to Cessation of Hostilities between Israel, Hamas | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases". press.un.org. Retrieved 25 March 2025.

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