Modal realism is the view propounded by philosopher David Lewis that all possible worlds are real in the same way as is the actual world: they are "of a kind with this world of ours."[1] It is based on four tenets: possible worlds exist, possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world, possible worlds are irreducible entities, and the term actual in actual world is indexical, i.e. any subject can declare their world to be the actual one, much as they label the place they are "here" and the time they are "now".
Extended modal realism is a form of modal realism that involves ontological commitments not just to possible worlds but also to impossible worlds. Objects are conceived as being spread out in the modal dimension, i.e., as having not just spatial and temporal parts but also modal parts. This contrasts with Lewis' modal realism, according to which each object only inhabits one possible world.
Common arguments for modal realism refer to their theoretical usefulness for modal reasoning and to commonly accepted expressions in natural language that seem to imply ontological commitments to possible worlds. A common objection to modal realism is that it leads to an inflated ontology, which some think runs counter to Occam's razor. Critics of modal realism have also pointed out that it is counterintuitive to allow possible objects the same ontological status as actual objects. This line of thought has been further developed in the argument from morality by showing how an equal treatment of actual and non-actual persons would lead to highly implausible consequences for morality, culminating in the moral principle that every choice is equally permissible.
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