Monotonicity criterion

A diagram showing who would win an IRV election for different electorates. The win region for each candidate is erratic, with random pixels dotting the image and jagged, star-shaped (convex) regions occupying much of the image. Moving the electorate to the left can cause a right-wing candidate to win, and vice versa.
A 4-candidate Yee diagram under IRV. The diagram shows who would win an IRV election if the electorate is centered at a particular point. Moving the electorate to the left can cause a right-wing candidate to win, and vice versa. Black lines show the optimal solution (achieved by Condorcet or score voting).

The monotonicity criterion, also called positive response[1] or positive vote weight,[2] is a principle of social choice theory that says that increasing a candidate's ranking or rating should not cause them to lose.[3] Positive response rules out cases where a candidate loses an election as a result of receiving too much support from voters (i.e. being "too popular to win").

Systems that violate positive response (such as instant-runoff) can create situations where a ballot has the opposite effect of what the voter intended. This runs counter to the intuition that increasing an option's popularity in a democratic election should only improve the chances of that option winning. As a result, German courts have previously struck down nonmonotonic systems for violating the right to equal and direct suffrage.[4][5]

Most voting systems (including Borda and all common tournament solutions) satisfy monotonicity,[3] as do all commonly-used rated voting methods (including approval and score).[note 1]

However, the criterion is violated by instant-runoff voting,[6] the single transferable vote, and Hamilton's apportionment method.[2]

The participation criterion is a closely-related, but different, concept. While positive responsiveness deals with a voter changing their opinion (or vote), participation deals with situations where a voter choosing to cast a ballot can have a reversed effect on the election.

  1. ^ May, Kenneth O. (1952). "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision". Econometrica. 20 (4): 680–684. doi:10.2307/1907651. ISSN 0012-9682. JSTOR 1907651.
  2. ^ a b Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2014). Proportional representation : apportionment methods and their applications. Internet Archive. Cham ; New York : Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-03855-1.
  3. ^ a b D R Woodall, "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules", Voting matters, Issue 6, 1996
  4. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2014). Proportional representation : apportionment methods and their applications. Internet Archive. Cham ; New York : Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-03855-1.
  5. ^ dpa (2013-02-22). "Bundestag beschließt neues Wahlrecht". Die Zeit (in German). ISSN 0044-2070. Retrieved 2024-05-02.
  6. ^ Ornstein, Joseph T.; Norman, Robert Z. (2014-10-01). "Frequency of monotonicity failure under Instant Runoff Voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections". Public Choice. 161 (1–2): 1–9. doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0118-2. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 30833409.


Cite error: There are <ref group=note> tags on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=note}} template (see the help page).


© MMXXIII Rich X Search. We shall prevail. All rights reserved. Rich X Search