Moore's paradox

Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" or "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining." The first author to note this apparent absurdity was George E. Moore.^[1] These 'Moorean' sentences, as they have become known, are paradoxical in that while they appear absurd, they nevertheless

Can be true;
Are (logically) consistent; and
Are not (obviously) contradictions.

The term 'Moore's paradox' is attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein,^[2] who considered the paradox Moore's most important contribution to philosophy.^[3] Wittgenstein wrote about the paradox extensively in his later writings,^[a] which brought Moore's paradox the attention it would not have otherwise received.^[4]

Moore's paradox has been associated with many other well-known logical paradoxes, including, though not limited to, the liar paradox, the knower paradox, the unexpected hanging paradox, and the preface paradox.^[5]

There is currently not any generally accepted explanation of Moore's paradox in the philosophical literature. However, while Moore's paradox remains a philosophical curiosity, Moorean-type sentences are used by logicians, computer scientists, and those working with artificial intelligence as examples of cases in which a knowledge, belief, or information system is not modified in response to new data.^[6]

^ Moore, G. E. (1993). "Moore's Paradox". In Baldwin, Thomas (ed.). G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. London: Routledge. pp. 207–212. ISBN 978-0-415-09853-3.
^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Section II.x. Blackwell Publishers. p. 190.
^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974). von Wright, G. H. (ed.). Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
^ Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980). Anscombe, G. E. M.; von Wright, G. H. (eds.). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 978-0-631-12541-9.
^ Sorensen, Roy A. (1988). Blindspots. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-824981-8.
^ Hendricks, Vincent F.; Symons, John (2006). "Where's the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic". Philosophical Studies. 128 (1): 137–167. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.330.3026. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-4060-0. ISSN 0031-8116. S2CID 11014804.

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[ReferenceA-1] Moore, G. E. (1993). "Moore's Paradox". In Baldwin, Thomas (ed.). G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. London: Routledge. pp. 207–212. ISBN 978-0-415-09853-3.

[2] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Section II.x. Blackwell Publishers. p. 190.

[3] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974). von Wright, G. H. (ed.). Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

[5] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980). Anscombe, G. E. M.; von Wright, G. H. (eds.). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 978-0-631-12541-9.

[Sorensen-6] Sorensen, Roy A. (1988). Blindspots. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-824981-8.

[7] Hendricks, Vincent F.; Symons, John (2006). "Where's the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic". Philosophical Studies. 128 (1): 137–167. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.330.3026. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-4060-0. ISSN 0031-8116. S2CID 11014804.

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