Native Women's Assn of Canada v Canada

Native Women's Assn of Canada v Canada
Supreme Court of Canada
Hearing: March 4, 1994 Judgment: October 27, 1994
Full case name	Her Majesty The Queen v Native Women's Association of Canada, Gail Stacey-Moore and Sharon McIvor
Citations	[1994] 3 SCR 627, 1994 CanLII 27, 119 DLR (4th) 224, [1995] 1 CNLR 47, (1994), 24 CRR (2d) 233, (1994), 84 FTR 240
Docket No.	23253 [1]
Prior history	Judgment for the claimants in the Federal Court of Appeal.
Holding
A claim to a positive obligation on the government under section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not supported by the evidence that an interest group's freedom of expression was not denied.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Antonio Lamer Puisne Justices: Gérard La Forest, Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, John Sopinka, Charles Gonthier, Peter Cory, Beverley McLachlin, Frank Iacobucci, John C. Major
Reasons given
Majority	Sopinka J., joined by Lamer C.J., La Forest, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, and Major JJ.
Concurrence	McLachlin J.

Native Women's Assn of Canada v Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627, was a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on section 2, section 15 and section 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in which the Court decided against the claim that the government of Canada had an obligation to financially support an interest group in constitutional negotiations, to allow the group to speak for its people. The case resulted from negotiations for the Charlottetown Accord, in which various groups representing Aboriginal peoples in Canada were financially supported by the government, but the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC) was not. Since NWAC claimed the other Aboriginal groups primarily represented Aboriginal men, it argued that section 28 (sexual equality under the Charter) could be used so that section 2 (freedom of expression) required the government to provide an equal benefit to Aboriginal women, supposedly represented by NWAC.

The case could be seen as unusual, because as the Court noted, "This case does not involve the typical situation of government action restricting or interfering with freedom of expression in the negative sense" and that "the respondents are requesting the Court to consider whether there may be a positive duty on governments to facilitate expression in certain circumstances."