Nigerian Civil War | |||||||||
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45,000[6]–100,000[10][11] combatants killed 3,000,000–4,000,000 Biafran civilians died from famine during the Nigerian naval blockade[12][full citation needed] 2,000,000–4,500,000 displaced,[13] 500,000 of whom fled abroad[14] |
The Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970), also known as the Biafran War, was a civil war fought between Nigeria and the Republic of Biafra, a secessionist state which had declared its independence from Nigeria in 1967. Nigeria was led by General Yakubu Gowon, and Biafra by Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka "Emeka" Odumegwu Ojukwu.[15] Biafra represented the nationalist aspirations of the Igbo ethnic group, whose leadership felt they could no longer coexist with the federal government dominated by the interests of the Muslim Hausa-Fulanis of Northern Nigeria.[16] The conflict resulted from political, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions which preceded the United Kingdom's formal decolonisation of Nigeria from 1960 to 1963. Immediate causes of the war in 1966 included a military coup, a counter-coup, and anti-Igbo pogroms in Northern Nigeria.[17]
Within a year, Nigerian government troops surrounded Biafra, and captured coastal oil facilities and the city of Port Harcourt. A blockade was imposed as a deliberate policy during the ensuing stalemate which led to the mass starvation of Biafran civilians.[18] During the 2+1⁄2 years of the war, there were about 100,000 overall military casualties, while between 500,000 and 2 million Biafran civilians died of starvation.[19]
Alongside the concurrent Vietnam War, the Nigerian Civil War was one of the first wars in human history to be televised to a global audience.[20] In mid-1968, images of malnourished and starving Biafran children saturated the mass media of Western countries. The plight of the starving Biafrans became a cause célèbre in foreign countries, enabling a significant rise in the funding and prominence of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Biafra received international humanitarian aid from civilians during the Biafran airlift, an event which inspired the formation of Doctors Without Borders following the end of the war. The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the main supporters of the Nigerian government, while France, Israel (after 1968) and some other countries supported Biafra.[21] The United States' official position was one of neutrality, considering Nigeria as "a responsibility of Britain",[22] but some interpret the refusal to recognise Biafra as favouring the Nigerian government.[23][24]
The war highlighted challenges within pan-Africanism during the early stages of African independence from colonial rule, suggesting that the diverse nature of African peoples may present obstacles to achieving common unity. Additionally, it shed light on initial shortcomings within the Organization of African Unity.[25] The war also resulted in the political marginalization of the Igbo people, as Nigeria has not had another Igbo president since the end of the war, leading some Igbo people to believe they are being unfairly punished for the war.[26] Igbo nationalism has emerged since the end of the war, as well as various neo-Biafran secessionist groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra.[27]
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The United States, on the other hand, professed neutrality considering Nigeria, in the words of an American diplomat, as 'a responsibility of Britain'.
Despite remaining officially neutral and declaring an arms embargo on both sides, the United States leaned more towards federal Nigeria. A report prepared for president Nixon in January 1969 sees U.S. options as limited, arguing that 'our role is important but it alone will not ensure a solution' and 'to the degree that we have leverage, we have it only with the Feds'. The U.S. thus followed a policy described in the report in the following terms: 'support the Feds diplomatically, endorse "One Nigeria" with Ibo protection but refuse to sell arms'.
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