Process philosophy

Process philosophy, also ontology of becoming, or processism,^[1] is an approach in philosophy that identifies processes, changes, or shifting relationships as the only real experience of everyday living.^[2] In opposition to the classical view of change as illusory (as argued by Parmenides) or accidental (as argued by Aristotle), process philosophy posits transient occasions of change or becoming as the only fundamental things of the ordinary everyday real world.

Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, classical ontology has posited ordinary world reality as constituted of enduring substances, to which transient processes are ontologically subordinate, if they are not denied. If Socrates changes, becoming sick, Socrates is still the same (the substance of Socrates being the same), and change (his sickness) only glides over his substance: change is accidental, and devoid of primary reality, whereas the substance is essential.

In physics, Ilya Prigogine^[3] distinguishes between the "physics of being" and the "physics of becoming". Process philosophy covers not just scientific intuitions and experiences, but can be used as a conceptual bridge to facilitate discussions among religion, philosophy, and science.^[4]^[5]

Process philosophy is sometimes classified as closer to continental philosophy than analytic philosophy, because it is usually only taught in continental philosophy departments.^[6] However, other sources state that process philosophy should be placed somewhere in the middle between the poles of analytic versus continental methods in contemporary philosophy.^[7]^[8]

^ Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy, SUNY Press, 1996, p. 42.
^ "Process Philosophy". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2022.
^ Ilya Prigogine, From being to becoming, David Bohm, "Wholeness and the Implicate Order", W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1980.
^ Jeremy R. Hustwit (2007). "Process Philosophy: 2.a. In Pursuit of a Holistic Worldview". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
^ Cf. Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, Frankfurt / Paris / Lancaster, Ontos Verlag, 2004.
^ William Blattner, "Some Thoughts About "Continental" and "Analytic" Philosophy"
^ Seibt, Johanna. "Process Philosophy". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
^ Nicholas Gaskill, A. J. Nocek, The Lure of Whitehead, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 4: "it is no wonder that Whitehead fell by the wayside. He was too scientific for the "continentals," not scientific enough for the "analytics," and too metaphysical—which is to say uncritical—for them both" and p. 231: "the analytics and Continentals are both inclined toward Kantian presuppositions in a manner that Latour and Whitehead brazenly renounce."

[1] Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy, SUNY Press, 1996, p. 42.

[2] "Process Philosophy". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2022.

[3] Ilya Prigogine, From being to becoming, David Bohm, "Wholeness and the Implicate Order", W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1980.

[Hustwit-4] Jeremy R. Hustwit (2007). "Process Philosophy: 2.a. In Pursuit of a Holistic Worldview". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[5] Cf. Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, Frankfurt / Paris / Lancaster, Ontos Verlag, 2004.

[6] William Blattner, "Some Thoughts About "Continental" and "Analytic" Philosophy"

[7] Seibt, Johanna. "Process Philosophy". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[8] Nicholas Gaskill, A. J. Nocek, The Lure of Whitehead, University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p. 4: "it is no wonder that Whitehead fell by the wayside. He was too scientific for the "continentals," not scientific enough for the "analytics," and too metaphysical—which is to say uncritical—for them both" and p. 231: "the analytics and Continentals are both inclined toward Kantian presuppositions in a manner that Latour and Whitehead brazenly renounce."

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