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Electoral systems |
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In social choice theory and politics, the spoiler effect or Arrow's paradox refers to a situation where a losing (that is, irrelevant) spoiler candidate affects the results of an election.[1][2] A voting system that is not affected by spoilers satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives or independence of spoilers.[3]
Arrow's impossibility theorem is a well-known theorem showing that all rank-based voting systems[note 1] are vulnerable to the spoiler effect. However, the frequency and severity of spoiler effects depends on the voting method. Plurality voting is highly senstive to spoilers unlike ranked-choice runoffs (RCV),[4][5] and can manufacture spoiler effects even when doing so is not forced,[2][6][7][8] a situation known as a center squeeze. Majority-rule methods are usually not affected by spoilers, which are limited to rare[9][10] situations called cyclic ties.[11]
Spoiler effects also occur in some methods of proportional representation, such as the single transferable vote (STV-PR or RCV-PR) and the largest remainders method of party-list representation, where a new party entering the election can cause the number of seats for each party to change, even if the vote totals of every other party are unaffected.
Rated voting systems are not subject to Arrow's theorem; as a result, many satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives (sometimes called spoilerproofness).[3][8][12]
A spoiler effect occurs when a single party or a candidate entering an election changes the outcome to favor a different candidate.
As with simple plurality elections, it is apparent the outcome will be highly sensitive to the distribution of candidates.
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does not do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
Candidates C and D spoiled the election for B ... With them in the running, A won, whereas without them in the running, B would have won. ... Instant runoff voting ... does not do away with the spoiler problem entirely, although it ... makes it less likely
IRV is subject to something called the "center squeeze." A popular moderate can receive relatively few first-place votes through no fault of her own but because of vote splitting from candidates to the right and left. ... Approval voting thus appears to solve the problem of vote splitting simply and elegantly. ... Range voting solves the problems of spoilers and vote splitting
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