Winning hearts and minds

Winning hearts and minds is a concept occasionally expressed in the resolution of war, insurgency, and other conflicts, in which one side seeks to prevail not by the use of superior force, but by making emotional or intellectual appeals to sway supporters of the other side.

The use of the term "hearts and minds" to reference a method of bringing a subjugated population on side, was first used by French general and colonial administrator Hubert Lyautey as part of his strategy to counter the Black Flags rebellion during the Tonkin campaign in 1895.^[1] The term has also been attributed to Gerald Templer's strategy during the Malayan Emergency.^[2]

The efficacy of "hearts and minds" as a counterinsurgency strategy has been debated.^[3]

^ Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare", in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, USA, 1986), 394.
^ Cite error: The named reference :0 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Hazelton, Jacqueline L. (2021). Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-5478-4. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctv16zjztj.

[1] Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare", in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, USA, 1986), 394.

[:0-2] Cite error: The named reference :0 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[3] Hazelton, Jacqueline L. (2021). Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-5478-4. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctv16zjztj.

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