Clientelism

Clientelism or client politics is the exchange of goods and services for political support, often involving an implicit or explicit quid-pro-quo.[1][2][3] It is closely related to patronage politics and vote buying.[4]

Clientelism involves an asymmetric relationship between groups of political actors described as patrons, brokers, and clients. In client politics, an organized interest group benefits at the expense of the public. Client politics may have a strong interaction with the dynamics of identity politics. This is particularly common in an elite pluralist or rigidly duopolistic system, such as in the United States, where lobbying can have considerable power shaping public policy. The opposite of client politics is entrepreneurial politics, or conviction politics. Although many definitions for clientelism have been proposed, according to the political scientist Allen Hicken, it is generally thought that there are four key elements of clientelistic relationships:

  • Dyadic relationships: Simply, these are two-way relationships.
  • Contingency: Delivery of a service to a citizen by a politician or broker is contingent on the citizen's actions on behalf of the politician or party through which they are receiving services.
  • Hierarchy: The politician or party is in a higher position of power than the citizen.
  • Iteration: The relationship is not a one-off exchange, but rather, ongoing.[5]

Contingency and iteration are the two components shared across most definitions of clientelism.[6]

  1. ^ Stokes, Susan C; Dunning, Thad; Nazareno, Marcelo; Brusco, Valeria (16 September 2013). Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-66039-7.
  2. ^ Pellicer, Miquel; Wegner, Eva; Bayer, Markus; Tischmeyer, Christian (2021). "Clientelism from the Client's Perspective: A Meta-Analysis of Ethnographic Literature". Perspectives on Politics. 20 (3): 931–947. doi:10.1017/S153759272000420X. ISSN 1537-5927. S2CID 234377324.
  3. ^ Hicken, Allen; Aspinall, Edward; Weiss, Meredith L.; Muhtadi, Burhanuddin (2022). "Buying Brokers: Electoral Handouts beyond Clientelism in a Weak-Party State". World Politics. 74 (1): 77–120. doi:10.1017/S0043887121000216. ISSN 0043-8871. S2CID 246488907.
  4. ^ Kramon, Eric (2017). Money for Votes: The Causes and Consequences of Electoral Clientelism in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108149839. ISBN 978-1-107-19372-7.
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Hicken 2011 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Hicken, Allen; Nathan, Noah L. (2020). "Clientelism's Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics". Annual Review of Political Science. 23: 277–294. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032657.

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