Back اجتثاث حزب البعث Arabic Débaasification French דה-בעת'יפיקציה HE Debasyfikacja Polish Desbaathificação Portuguese
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De-Ba'athification (Arabic: اجتثاث حزب البعث) refers to a policy undertaken in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and subsequent Iraqi governments to remove the Ba'ath Party's influence in the new Iraqi political system after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.[1] It was considered by the CPA to be Iraq's equivalent to Germany's denazification after World War II. It was first outlined in CPA Order 1 which entered into force on 16 May 2003.[1] The order declared that all public sector employees affiliated with the Ba'ath Party were to be removed from their positions and to be banned from any future employment in the public sector.[1]
The policy was highly controversial among many American academics, institutions, government, military, and international media and debate outlets.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9] The policy under the CPA was officially rescinded on 28 June 2004 as part of the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government two days later.[10] However, elements of the policy continued under the Iraqi Governing Council and later under the elected Iraqi Parliament.[11]
The De-Baathification order was drafted by relatively unknown mid-level Pentagon officials and emerged from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s office.[12]
Proponents of the policy contend that the policy effectively cleansed Iraqi society of Ba'athist influence, facilitating the creation of a democratic Iraqi government.[5][8] Critics argue that the policy was not only undemocratic, but also a significant factor in the deteriorating security situation throughout Iraq.[12][7][13][14][15][16] The policy became associated with anti-Sunni sectarian overtones due to its disproportionate targeting of Sunni civil servants and army officials.[17]
- ^ a b c "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society" (PDF). Coalition Provisional Authority. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 June 2004. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ Goodman, Amy. "Juan Cole's 10-Point Plan for U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Iraq". Democracy Now!. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ "From De-Bolshevism to De-Baathification: Post-Soviet Europe's Lessons for Iraq after Saddam". American Enterprise Institute. Archived from the original on 21 April 2014. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ "Remaking Iraq: Success, Failure, and the Foundation of a New State". American Enterprise Institute. Archived from the original on 21 April 2014. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ a b "Toward Democracy: A Briefing by Ahmad Chalabi". American Enterprise Institute. Archived from the original on 21 April 2014. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ White, Jeffrey. "Complicity in Iraq: How Deep?". Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ a b "Britain 'tried to keep Iraq army". British Broadcasting Company. 9 December 2006. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ a b "De-Baathification and the Rebuilding of Iraq". National Public Radio. 21 April 2005. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ Ferguson, Charles (2007). "No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent into Chaos".
- ^ "Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 100: Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority" (PDF). Coalition Provisional Authority. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 14 October 2010.
- ^ "Unofficial Translation of Iraq's Accountability and Justice Law". International Center for Transitional Justice. January 2008. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ a b "Orders of Disorder". Foreign Affairs. 2023.
Over the last 20 years, as the United States has reckoned with the human toll and costly legacy of its disastrous war of choice in the Middle East, those two infamous decisions of Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority—CPA Order 1, de-Baathifying the Iraqi state, and CPA Order 2, dissolving the Iraqi military—have been held up as some of the worst mistakes of the war. They are seen as sparks that would ignite the insurgency to come and set Iraq aflame for years, a period of disorder that would claim the lives of thousands of U.S. troops and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians.
- ^ Henderson & Tucker, p. 19.
- ^ Da'ud, Muhammad (1 December 2003). "The Iraqi Resistance... Remnants of a Past and Foundations of a Future". Al-Jazeera (in Arabic). Archived from the original on 6 May 2005. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ Al-Khattab, Faleh (23 March 2004). "The Future of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq". Al-Jazeera (in Arabic). Archived from the original on 25 February 2005. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ "Mullen's Plain Talk About U.S. Mistakes in Iraq". National Public Radio. 1 August 2007. Retrieved 24 September 2010.
- ^ Harris, William (2018). "Glossary". Quicksilver War: Syria, Iraq and the Spiral of Conflict. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA: Oxford University Press. p. 176. ISBN 9780190874872.
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