Elections in Cuba

Elections in Cuba are held at municipal, provincial, and national levels. Cuba is a one-party state, with the Communist Party of Cuba being described as the "superior driving force of the society and the state" in the Constitution of Cuba, and the communist party is the only official political party. Elections in Cuba are not considered democratic because the government does not allow free and fair voting.^[1]

There are currently 470 seats in the National Assembly of People's Power, Cuba's unicameral legislature, reduced from 605 seats after the 2023 elections. There is only one candidate for each seat in the Assembly, with all being nominated by committees that are firmly controlled by the Communist Party.^[2]^[3] Most legislative districts elect multiple representatives to the Assembly. Voters can select individual candidates on their ballot, select every candidate, or leave every question blank, with no option to vote against candidates.^[4]^[5] During the 2013 elections, around 80% of voters selected every candidate for the Assembly on their ballot, while 4.6% submitted a blank ballot; no candidate for the Assembly has lost an election in Cuban history.^[6] Cuba was ranked second least electoral democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean according to V-Dem Democracy indices in 2023 with a score of 0.178 out of one.^[7]^[8]

The National Assembly is only in session twice per year, with the Council of State exercising the legislative authority throughout the rest of the year. The 21 members of the Council of State are elected by the Assembly, and a 2021 study determined that most members of the Council may have been defeated if they were elected by the people instead.^[9]

According to the 2019 Constitution of Cuba, the National Assembly retains the power to elect the president of Cuba, who in turn retains the power to "propose the election, appointment, suspension, revocation, or replacement" of the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, members of the Council of Ministers, the president, vice president and magistrates of the People's Supreme Court, the prosecutor general and the comptroller general of the republic and their deputies, the president and members of the National Electoral Council, all subject to approval of the National Assembly, which can also revoke or replace any officeholder it appoints.^[10]^[11]

^
Multiple sources:
- Hyde, Susan D. (2011). The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm. Cornell University Press. pp. 122–123. ISBN 978-0-8014-6125-5.
- Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (2019-10-03). "Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election". Democratization. 26 (7): 1278–1298. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1629420. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 197727359.
- Domínguez, Jorge I.; Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (2017). "Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions: Election Day Outcomes in Cuba". Latin American Politics and Society. 59 (2): 27–52. doi:10.1111/laps.12017. ISSN 1531-426X. S2CID 157677498.
- Domínguez, Jorge I. (2021). "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba's Council of State in a Comparative Context". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 54 (1–2): 45–65. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.1-2.45. ISSN 0967-067X. S2CID 236365630.
^ Smyth, Regina; Bianco, William; Chan, Kwan Nok (2019-04-25). "Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Hong Kong's Legislative Council". The Journal of Politics. 81 (3): 892–905. doi:10.1086/703068. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 159138096.
^ Braithwaite, Alex; Braithwaite, Jessica Maves (2020). "Restricting Opposition in Elections and Terrorist Violence". Terrorism and Political Violence. 32 (7): 1550–1572. doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1495627. ISSN 0954-6553. S2CID 149575921.
^ Cite error: The named reference :3 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Leogrande, William M. (2012). The Cuban communist party and electoral politics: Adaptation, succession, and transition. Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. ISBN 978-0-9704916-2-6.
^ Fonseca Galvis, Ángela; Superti, Chiara (2019-10-03). "Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election". Democratization. 26 (7): 1278–1298. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1629420. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 197727359.
^ V-Dem Institute (2023). "The V-Dem Dataset". Retrieved 14 October 2023.
^ Democracy Report 2023, Table 3, V-Dem Institute, 2023
^ Domínguez, Jorge I. (2021-06-01). "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime LeadersCuba's Council of State in a Comparative Context". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 54 (1–2): 45–65. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.1-2.45. ISSN 0967-067X. S2CID 236365630.
^ Rojas, Rafael (November 2020). "The New Cuban Executive Branch: Constitutional Changes in the Power Structure" (PDF). Briefings on Cuba. Florida International University. Retrieved 24 November 2023.
^ Hoffmann, Bert, ed. (2021). Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba (PDF). Verlag Barbara Budrich. doi:10.3224/84742546. ISBN 978-3-8474-2546-5. Retrieved 24 November 2023.

[1] Multiple sources:
Hyde, Susan D. (2011). The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm. Cornell University Press. pp. 122–123. ISBN 978-0-8014-6125-5.

Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (2019-10-03). "Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election". Democratization. 26 (7): 1278–1298. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1629420. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 197727359.

Domínguez, Jorge I.; Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (2017). "Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions: Election Day Outcomes in Cuba". Latin American Politics and Society. 59 (2): 27–52. doi:10.1111/laps.12017. ISSN 1531-426X. S2CID 157677498.

Domínguez, Jorge I. (2021). "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba's Council of State in a Comparative Context". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 54 (1–2): 45–65. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.1-2.45. ISSN 0967-067X. S2CID 236365630.

[2] Hyde, Susan D. (2011). The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm. Cornell University Press. pp. 122–123. ISBN 978-0-8014-6125-5.

[3] Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (2019-10-03). "Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election". Democratization. 26 (7): 1278–1298. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1629420. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 197727359.

[4] Domínguez, Jorge I.; Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (2017). "Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions: Election Day Outcomes in Cuba". Latin American Politics and Society. 59 (2): 27–52. doi:10.1111/laps.12017. ISSN 1531-426X. S2CID 157677498.

[5] Domínguez, Jorge I. (2021). "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba's Council of State in a Comparative Context". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 54 (1–2): 45–65. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.1-2.45. ISSN 0967-067X. S2CID 236365630.

[:4-2] Smyth, Regina; Bianco, William; Chan, Kwan Nok (2019-04-25). "Legislative Rules in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Hong Kong's Legislative Council". The Journal of Politics. 81 (3): 892–905. doi:10.1086/703068. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 159138096.

[:5-3] Braithwaite, Alex; Braithwaite, Jessica Maves (2020). "Restricting Opposition in Elections and Terrorist Violence". Terrorism and Political Violence. 32 (7): 1550–1572. doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1495627. ISSN 0954-6553. S2CID 149575921.

[:3-4] Cite error: The named reference :3 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[5] Leogrande, William M. (2012). The Cuban communist party and electoral politics: Adaptation, succession, and transition. Cuba Transition Project, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. ISBN 978-0-9704916-2-6.

[6] Fonseca Galvis, Ángela; Superti, Chiara (2019-10-03). "Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election". Democratization. 26 (7): 1278–1298. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1629420. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 197727359.

[vdem_dataset-7] V-Dem Institute (2023). "The V-Dem Dataset". Retrieved 14 October 2023.

[vdem_report-8] Democracy Report 2023, Table 3, V-Dem Institute, 2023

[9] Domínguez, Jorge I. (2021-06-01). "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime LeadersCuba's Council of State in a Comparative Context". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 54 (1–2): 45–65. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.1-2.45. ISSN 0967-067X. S2CID 236365630.

[10] Rojas, Rafael (November 2020). "The New Cuban Executive Branch: Constitutional Changes in the Power Structure" (PDF). Briefings on Cuba. Florida International University. Retrieved 24 November 2023.

[11] Hoffmann, Bert, ed. (2021). Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba (PDF). Verlag Barbara Budrich. doi:10.3224/84742546. ISBN 978-3-8474-2546-5. Retrieved 24 November 2023.

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