Social choice theory

Social choice theory or social choice is a branch of economics that analyzes mechanisms and procedures for collective decisions.[1] Social choice incorporates insights from welfare economics, mathematics, and political science to find the best ways to combine individual opinions, preferences, or beliefs into a single coherent measure of well-being.

Whereas decision theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences.[2]

It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society. Using elements of formal logic for generality, analysis proceeds from a set of seemingly reasonable axioms of social choice to form a social welfare function (or constitution).[3]

  1. ^ Amartya Sen (2008). "Social Choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract & TOC.
  2. ^ Zwicker, William S.; Moulin, Herve (2016), Brandt, Felix; Conitzer, Vincent; Endriss, Ulle; Lang, Jerome (eds.), "Introduction to the Theory of Voting", Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–56, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107446984.003, ISBN 978-1-107-44698-4, retrieved 2021-12-24
  3. ^ For example, in Kenneth J. Arrow (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, ch. II, section 2, A Notation for Preferences and Choice, and ch. III, "The Social Welfare Function".

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