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While initially seeking a state in all of Mandatory Palestine that would replace Israel, Hamas began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007.[63][64][65] In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel.[66][67][68][69] Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years[70]) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution,[71][72][73][74] while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[75][76] While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.[77][78][79][80] Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context.[81] In terms of foreign policy, Hamas has historically sought out relations with Egypt,[82] Iran,[82] Qatar,[83] Saudi Arabia,[84] Syria[82] and Turkey[85]; some of its relations have been impacted by the Arab Spring.[86][clarification needed]
Hamas has carried out attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers, including suicide bombings and indiscriminate rocket attacks.[87] These actions have led human rights groups to accuse it of war crimes. Argentina, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Paraguay, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union[44] have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. In 2018, a motion at the United Nations to condemn Hamas was rejected.[e][89][90]
^Lopez, Anthony; Ireland, Carol; Ireland, Jane; Lewis, Michael (2020). The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding. Taylor & Francis. p. 239. ISBN9780429588952. The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s. It used terrorist attacks against civilians - particularly suicide bombings – to help build a larger movement, going so far as to emerge as the recognized government of the Gaza Strip in the Palestine Authority.
^Seurat 2019, pp. 17–19: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."
^*Baconi 2018, pp. 114–116: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *Roy 2013, p. 210: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."
^Baconi 2018, pp. 82: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders."
^Sources that believe that Hamas' 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders:
Bjorn Brenner. Gaza Under Hamas. I. B. Tauris. p. 206.
^Cite error: The named reference atran was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Halim Rane (2009). Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms. p. 34. Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."
^Baconi 2018, p. 108Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that "a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary."
^Loren D. Lybarger (2020). Palestinian Chicago. University of California Press. p. 199. Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).
^Tristan Dunning (2016). Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy. Routledge. pp. 179–180.
^Cite error: The named reference Alsoos was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Qossay Hamed (2023). Hamas in Power: The Question of Transformation. IGI Global. p. 161.
^Timea Spitka (2023). National and International Civilian Protection Strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Springer International Publishing. p. 88-89.
^Dupret, Baudouin; Lynch, Michael; Berard, Tim (2015). Law at Work: Studies in Legal Ethnomethods. Oxford University Press. p. 279. ISBN9780190210243. [It has been alleged that] Hamas cynically abuses its own civilian population and their suffering for propaganda purposes.
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