Opposition to Vladimir Putin in Russia

Opposition to the government of President Vladimir Putin in Russia, commonly referred to as the Russian opposition, can be divided between the parliamentary opposition parties in the State Duma and the various non-systemic opposition organizations. While the former are largely viewed as being more or less loyal to the government and Putin,^[1]^[2] the latter oppose the government and are mostly unrepresented in government bodies. According to Russian NGO Levada Center, about 15% of the Russian population disapproved of Putin in the beginning of 2023.^[3]^[4]

The "systemic opposition" is mainly composed of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), A Just Russia – For Truth (SRZP), New People and other minor parties; these political groups, while claiming to be in opposition, generally support the government's policies.^[5]^[6]

Major political parties considered to be part of the non-systemic opposition include Yabloko and the People's Freedom Party (PARNAS), along with the unregistered party Russia of the Future and Libertarian Party of Russia (LPR). Other notable opposition groups included the Russian Opposition Coordination Council (KSO) (2012–2013) and The Other Russia (2006–2011), as well as various non-governmental organizations (NGOs).^[5]

Their supporters vary in political ideology, ranging from liberals, socialists, and anarchists, to Russian nationalists. They are mainly unified by their opposition to Putin and government corruption. However, a lack of unity within the opposition has also hindered its standing.^[7]^[8]^[9] Opposition figures claim that a number of laws have been passed and other measures taken by Putin's government to prevent them from having any electoral success.

^ Ben Noble, Putin just won a supermajority in the Duma. That matters. Archived 28 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine, Washington Post (1 October 2016): "During the 2011-2016 parliamentary session, the Kremlin often engineered supermajorities with votes from loyal opposition Duma deputies."
^ Thomas F Remington, Presidential Decrees in Russia: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 44: "The 'within-system' opposition parties, such as the communists and A Just Russia, must be willing to play their prescribed role as tame, domesticated versions of a real opposition."
^ "Indicators". Retrieved 26 September 2023.
^ "Putin's approval rating ends 2022 at 81%, boosted by support for the war in Ukraine". www.intellinews.com. 2 January 2023. Retrieved 26 September 2023.
^ ^a ^b Ros, Cameron (3 March 2016). Systemic and Non-Systemic Opposition in the Russian Federation: Civil Society Awakens?. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN 9781317047230. Archived from the original on 23 March 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2022.
^ The Russian Awakening (PDF). Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2012. p. 16. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 November 2022. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
^ Peter Finn, Infighting Fractures Russian Opposition: Kremlin's Democratic Foes Help Marginalize Themselves With Suspicions, Old Feuds Archived 25 July 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Washington Post (28 March 2007).
^ A fourth term for Russia's perpetual president Archived 27 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economist (19 March 2018): "a fractured opposition."
^ Zemlyanskaya, Alisa (5 July 2022). "Этот поезд в огне: как российские партизаны поджигают военкоматы и пускают поезда под откос". The Insider (in Russian). Archived from the original on 10 August 2022. Retrieved 18 September 2023.

[1] Ben Noble, Putin just won a supermajority in the Duma. That matters. Archived 28 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine, Washington Post (1 October 2016): "During the 2011-2016 parliamentary session, the Kremlin often engineered supermajorities with votes from loyal opposition Duma deputies."

[2] Thomas F Remington, Presidential Decrees in Russia: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 44: "The 'within-system' opposition parties, such as the communists and A Just Russia, must be willing to play their prescribed role as tame, domesticated versions of a real opposition."

[3] "Indicators". Retrieved 26 September 2023.

[4] "Putin's approval rating ends 2022 at 81%, boosted by support for the war in Ukraine". www.intellinews.com. 2 January 2023. Retrieved 26 September 2023.

[Ros-5] Ros, Cameron (3 March 2016). Systemic and Non-Systemic Opposition in the Russian Federation: Civil Society Awakens?. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN 9781317047230. Archived from the original on 23 March 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2022.

[6] The Russian Awakening (PDF). Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2012. p. 16. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 November 2022. Retrieved 28 November 2022.

[7] Peter Finn, Infighting Fractures Russian Opposition: Kremlin's Democratic Foes Help Marginalize Themselves With Suspicions, Old Feuds Archived 25 July 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Washington Post (28 March 2007).

[8] A fourth term for Russia's perpetual president Archived 27 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine, The Economist (19 March 2018): "a fractured opposition."

[theinsider.pro-9] Zemlyanskaya, Alisa (5 July 2022). "Этот поезд в огне: как российские партизаны поджигают военкоматы и пускают поезда под откос". The Insider (in Russian). Archived from the original on 10 August 2022. Retrieved 18 September 2023.

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