Regulatory capture

In politics, regulatory capture (also called agency capture) is a form of corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulator is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group.^[1]^[2]

When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for society. The theory of client politics is related to that of rent-seeking and political failure; client politics "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers)".^[3]

^ Dal Bó, Ernesto (2006). "Regulatory capture: A review". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 22 (2): 203–225. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013. JSTOR 23606888.
^ "Regulatory Capture Definition". Investopedia. Archived from the original on October 3, 2015. Retrieved October 2, 2015.
^ Wilson, James (2000). Bureaucracy : what government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0465007856.^{[page needed]}

[1] Dal Bó, Ernesto (2006). "Regulatory capture: A review". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 22 (2): 203–225. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013. JSTOR 23606888.

[2] "Regulatory Capture Definition". Investopedia. Archived from the original on October 3, 2015. Retrieved October 2, 2015.

[3] Wilson, James (2000). Bureaucracy : what government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0465007856.^{[page needed]}

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