Chilean expansionism

Painting of numerous ships in front of a bay.
The Chilean Navy, its vessels depicted anchored in Valparaíso's bay in 1879 by Thomas Somerscales, was the central instrument of Chile's expansionism during the 1800s.
Map of Chile including offshore islands, maritime exclusive economic zone and its Antarctic claim.

Chilean expansionism refers to the foreign policy of Chile to expand its territorial control over key strategic locations and economic resources as a means to ensure its national security and assert its power in South America.[A] Chile's significant territorial acquisitions, which occurred mostly throughout the 19th century, paved the way for its emergence as a thalassocracy and one of the three most powerful and wealthiest states in South America during the 20th century. It also formed Chile's geopolitical and national identity as a tricontinental state and one of the countries with the longest coastlines in the world.

The most of the territory was owned by Chile de jure but not controlled de facto.

After achieving its independence from Spain in 1818, Chile held control of territory spanning roughly the same boundaries of the colonial general captaincy that was under the control of the Spanish Empire's Viceroyalty of Peru. Under the uti possidetis iuris principle that delimited the international boundaries of the newly independent South American states, Chile bordered at its north with Bolivia in the Atacama Desert and at its east with Argentina. To the south, Chile claimed all lands west of the Andes and the entirety of Patagonia (principally for the Strait of Magellan), but in practice controlled only the area down to the Bío Bío River plus the area between Valdivia and Chiloé—the rest of the territory being either controlled by the independent Mapuche of Araucanía or sparsely populated by other indigenous tribes.

The uti possidetis system proved ephemeral, nonetheless; the lack of formal border treaties caused territorial disputes throughout the continent. This uncertainty presented both challenges and opportunities for Chile, with regional instability creating a precarious state of diplomatic affairs but also allowing the growth of Chilean power ambitions. The Chilean national elite sought to ensure that the country's territorial limits and the regional balance of power would favor their economic and political aspirations. Towards this end, the country increased its military power, especially its naval presence, to pursue a policy of intimidation and force.[2]

To its north, Chile imposed its dominance by eliminating the threat posed by the union of Bolivia with Peru during the War of the Confederation (1836–1839), followed by the conquest of these countries' mineral-rich territories in the Atacama during the War of the Pacific (1879–1884)—in the process leaving Bolivia landlocked and occupying the Peruvian capital. To its south and east, Chile used military force and colonization to occupy Araucanía (1861–1883) and successfully dispute Argentine claims over westernmost Patagonia and the Strait of Magellan—the outbreak of war only narrowly avoided in multiple occasions. Chile's expansionist drive practically culminated with Easter Island's annexation in 1888, but vestiges of it continued well into the 20th century—e.g., the country's claim over Antarctic territory in 1940.

Although Chile did not fulfill all of its territorial ambitions, its relative success attracted the attention of the Western Hemisphere's other major expansionist polity, the United States, and cemented Chile's status as a regional power in Latin America. Chile's territorial expansion also left a legacy of distrust with its neighbors, all of which continue having boundary disputes with Chile. The country's mistreatment of the non-Chilean inhabitants of its conquered territories, particularly the state-sponsored forced cultural assimilation process of "Chilenization", have further led to internal tensions and calls for greater autonomy, if not independence, from the Mapuche and the Rapa Nui.[3]

  1. ^ Kurtz 2013, pp. 89–90.
  2. ^ Rauch 1999, pp. 186.
  3. ^ EGAÑA, R. (2008). Informe de la Comisión Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato con los Pueblos Indígenas. Santiago de Chile, Comisionado presidencial para Asuntos Indígenas. (PDF)


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