Condorcet winner criterion

In an election, a candidate is called a Condorcet (English: /kɒndɔːrˈs/), beats-all, or majority-rule winner[1][2][3] if a majority of voters would support them in a race against any other candidate. Such a candidate is also called an undefeated or tournament champion (by analogy with round-robin tournaments). Voting systems where a majority-rule winner will always win the election are said to satisfy the majority-rule principle, also known as the Condorcet criterion. Condorcet voting methods extend majority rule to elections with more than one candidate.

Surprisingly, an election may not have a beats-all winner, because there can be a rock, paper, scissors-style cycle, where multiple candidates all defeat each other (Rock < Paper < Scissors < Rock). This is called Condorcet's voting paradox.[4]

If voters are arranged on a left-right political spectrum and prefer candidates who are more similar to themselves, a majority-rule winner always exists, and is also the candidate whose ideology is most representative of the electorate. This result is known as the median voter theorem.[5] While political candidates differ in ways other than left-right ideology, which can lead to voting paradoxes,[6][7] such situations tend to be rare in practice.[8]

  1. ^ Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Seedig, Hans Georg (2016). "Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice". Econometrica. 84 (5): 1839–1880. arXiv:1503.00694. doi:10.3982/ECTA13337. ISSN 0012-9682.
  2. ^ Sen, Amartya (2020). "Majority decision and Condorcet winners". Social Choice and Welfare. 54 (2/3): 211–217. doi:10.1007/s00355-020-01244-4. ISSN 0176-1714. JSTOR 45286016.
  3. ^ Lewyn, Michael (2012), Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting (SSRN Scholarly Paper), Rochester, NY, retrieved 2024-04-21{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  4. ^ Fishburn, Peter C. (1977). "Condorcet Social Choice Functions". SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics. 33 (3): 469–489. doi:10.1137/0133030. ISSN 0036-1399.
  5. ^ Black, Duncan (1948). "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making". The Journal of Political Economy. 56 (1): 23–34. doi:10.1086/256633. JSTOR 1825026. S2CID 153953456.
  6. ^ Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Granić, Đura-Georg (2015-09-01). "Political space representations with approval data". Electoral Studies. 39: 56–71. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.04.003. hdl:1765/111247. The analysis reveals that the underlying political landscapes ... are inherently multidimensional and cannot be reduced to a single left-right dimension, or even to a two-dimensional space.
  7. ^ Black, Duncan; Newing, R.A. (2013-03-09). McLean, Iain S. [in Welsh]; McMillan, Alistair; Monroe, Burt L. (eds.). The Theory of Committees and Elections by Duncan Black and Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation by Duncan Black and R.A. Newing. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 9789401148603. For instance, if preferences are distributed spatially, there need only be two or more dimensions to the alternative space for cyclic preferences to be almost inevitable
  8. ^ Van Deemen, Adrian (2014-03-01). "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox". Public Choice. 158 (3): 311–330. doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3. ISSN 1573-7101.

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