Hegemonic stability theory

Hegemonic stability theory (HST) is a theory of international relations, rooted in research from the fields of political science, economics, and history. HST indicates that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power, or hegemon.^[1] Thus, the end of hegemony diminishes the stability of the international system. As evidence for the stability of hegemony, proponents of HST frequently point to the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, as well as the instability prior to World War I (when British hegemony was in decline) and the instability of the interwar period (when the American hegemon reduced its presence from world politics).^[2]^[3]

The key mechanisms in hegemonic stability theory revolve around public goods provision: to resolve collective action problems regarding public goods, a powerful actor who is willing and able to shoulder a disproportionate share of public goods provision is needed.^[4] Hegemonic stability may entail self-reinforcing cooperation, as it is in the interest of the hegemon to provide public goods and it is in interest of other states to maintain an international order from which they derive public goods.^[4]^[5]^[6]^[7]

^ Joshua S. Goldstein. International Relations. New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005. 83, 107.
^ Cohen, Benjamin J. (2008). International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton University Press. p. 77. ISBN 978-0-691-13569-4.
^ Oatley, Thomas (2019). International Political Economy: Sixth Edition. Routledge. pp. 60–61. ISBN 978-1-351-03464-7.
^ ^a ^b Norrlöf, Carla (2010). America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511676406. ISBN 978-0-521-76543-5.
^ Ikenberry, G. John (Winter 1998–1999). "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order". International Security. 23 (3): 43–78. doi:10.1162/isec.23.3.43. JSTOR 2539338. S2CID 57566810.
^ Norrlof, Carla; Wohlforth, William C. (2019). "Raison de l'Hégémonie (The Hegemon's Interest): Theory of the Costs and Benefits of Hegemony". Security Studies. 28 (3): 422–450. doi:10.1080/09636412.2019.1604982. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 197802117.
^ Wohlforth, William C. (1999). "The Stability of a Unipolar World". International Security. 24 (1): 5–41. doi:10.1162/016228899560031. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2539346. S2CID 57568539.

[1] Joshua S. Goldstein. International Relations. New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005. 83, 107.

[:9-2] Cohen, Benjamin J. (2008). International Political Economy: An Intellectual History. Princeton University Press. p. 77. ISBN 978-0-691-13569-4.

[:12-3] Oatley, Thomas (2019). International Political Economy: Sixth Edition. Routledge. pp. 60–61. ISBN 978-1-351-03464-7.

[:0-4] Norrlöf, Carla (2010). America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511676406. ISBN 978-0-521-76543-5.

[Ikenberry-5] Ikenberry, G. John (Winter 1998–1999). "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order". International Security. 23 (3): 43–78. doi:10.1162/isec.23.3.43. JSTOR 2539338. S2CID 57566810.

[6] Norrlof, Carla; Wohlforth, William C. (2019). "Raison de l'Hégémonie (The Hegemon's Interest): Theory of the Costs and Benefits of Hegemony". Security Studies. 28 (3): 422–450. doi:10.1080/09636412.2019.1604982. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 197802117.

[7] Wohlforth, William C. (1999). "The Stability of a Unipolar World". International Security. 24 (1): 5–41. doi:10.1162/016228899560031. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2539346. S2CID 57568539.

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