Rationalism (international relations)

Rational choice (also termed rationalism) is a prominent framework in international relations scholarship. Rational choice is not a substantive theory of international politics, but rather a methodological approach that focuses on certain types of social explanation for phenomena.^[1] In that sense, it is similar to constructivism, and differs from liberalism and realism, which are substantive theories of world politics.^[1]^[2] Rationalist analyses have been used to substantiate realist theories,^[3]^[4]^[5] as well as liberal theories of international relations.^[6]^[7]

Rational choice research tends to explain conditions that bring about outcomes or patterns of behavior if relevant actors behave rationally.^[1] Key concepts in rational choice research in international relations include incomplete information, credibility, signaling, transaction costs, trust, and audience costs.

^ ^a ^b ^c Cite error: The named reference :8 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Finnemore, Martha; Sikkink, Kathryn (2001). "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics". Annual Review of Political Science. 4 (1): 391–416. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391. S2CID 3640392.
^ Cite error: The named reference :2 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^ Glaser, Charles L. (2010). Rational Theory of International Politics. Princeton University Press. doi:10.1515/9781400835133. ISBN 978-1-4008-3513-3.
^ Kydd, Andrew (2005). "Trust and Mistrust in International Relations". Princeton University Press. JSTOR j.ctv39x4z5.
^ Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN 978-0-521-79227-1.
^ Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". The American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 2944796. S2CID 36315471.

[:8-1] Cite error: The named reference :8 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[:02-2] Finnemore, Martha; Sikkink, Kathryn (2001). "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics". Annual Review of Political Science. 4 (1): 391–416. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391. S2CID 3640392.

[:2-3] Cite error: The named reference :2 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

[4] Glaser, Charles L. (2010). Rational Theory of International Politics. Princeton University Press. doi:10.1515/9781400835133. ISBN 978-1-4008-3513-3.

[5] Kydd, Andrew (2005). "Trust and Mistrust in International Relations". Princeton University Press. JSTOR j.ctv39x4z5.

[6] Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN 978-0-521-79227-1.

[:9-7] Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". The American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 2944796. S2CID 36315471.

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